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DEEPWATER LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS PORTS 
AND THE SHIFTING U.S. LIQUEFIED NATURAL 
GAS MARKET 
Sean T. Dixon∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States has been historically at the “end of the pipeline” 
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) and regular imports are needed in some 
regions to augment seasonal shortages in supply.   Because the United 
States has become a more significant producer of natural gas (highest in 
the world),1  regional markets here tend to no longer rely on LNG 
cargoes for gas supply.  According to the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), “LNG imports to the United States were generally 
not viewed as competitive with domestic supplies of natural gas and 
pipeline imports from Canada through the 1980s and 1990s.”2  In the 
early 2000s, however, domestic gas production began to decline—
precipitating a rise in gas prices that made foreign LNG import (then still 
reliant on young, expensive technologies) affordable wholesale.3    
In order to facilitate the utilization of an inexpensive new fuel 
option, Congress amended the Deepwater Port Act (DWPA) to cover 
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 1. BEYOND PETROLEUM, BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF WORLD ENERGY 24 (2010), 
available at http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/ 
reports_and_publications/statistical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_
downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy_full_report_2010.pdf. 
 2. What Role Does Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Play as an Energy Source for the 
United States? U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/ 
liquefied_natural_gas_lng.cfm (last updated Dec. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Role of LNG].  
 3. Id. 
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LNG import facilities.4  The DWPA, until then, had been a largely 
unused law, allowing for the licensing of ports located on the U.S.’s 
outer continental shelf where oil cargoes could be offloaded and funneled 
through pipelines to mainland refineries.  In the 2002 amended DWPA, 
the joint-jurisdiction of the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and the 
Department of Transportation’s sub-agency, the Maritime 
Administration (MARAD), was extended beyond deepwater oil ports to 
include LNG port applications, licensing, construction, operation, and 
decommissioning by virtue of the act’s extension to natural gas.5  
Approval of onshore pipeline interconnections remained in the purview 
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and commodity 
import/export approval remained with the Department of Energy.6   
Along with a push to build deepwater LNG ports, interest in onshore 
LNG terminal construction and re-commissioning was also renewed. 
Unfortunately, once deepwater LNG ports started coming online 
(beginning with the Gulf Gateway in the Gulf of Mexico), LNG imports 
almost immediately began to become unprofitable and unpredictable.  
There were “substantial changes in year-over-year imports as a result of 
suppliers’ decisions to either bring spare cargos to the United States or to 
divert cargos to countries where prices may be higher.”7  In New 
England, a dearth of pipeline capacity acted as a bottleneck for interstate 
gas transmission, so the installation of three LNG import facilities—two 
offshore “deepwater ports” and one onshore terminal—remained 
economically viable.  Because that region’s gas prices are closer to the 
global market prices, LNG cargoes frequent those deepwater ports more 
than in the Gulf of Mexico. 
LNG remains an expensive, foreign, spot-market-purchase 
commodity.  Regardless of whether a region had the capacity to import 
LNG cargoes, abundant domestic supplies have made it too economically 
burdensome to purchase gas from foreign nations for consumer, 
residential, and industrial uses.  In 2009, U.S. import capacity was only 
                                            
 4. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-295, § 106, 116 Stat. 
2064, 2086 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2006)). 
 5. See 33 U.S.C. § 1503(a)-(i) (2006). 
 6. See Memorandum of Understanding Related to the Licensing of Deepwater Ports, 
art. III (2003-2004), http://www.ferc.gov/legal/maj-ord-reg/mou/mou-23.pdf [hereinafter 
Licensing MOU] (granting FERC jurisdiction over “authorizing the construction and 
operation of interstate natural gas pipelines” and any deepwater port-associated “facilities 
to the landward side of the high water mark.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2006) 
(granting the Department of Energy authority over “the importation or exportation of 
natural gas in foreign commerce”). 
 7. Role of LNG, supra note 2. 
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operating at eleven percent—meaning there could be a nine-fold increase 
in LNG cargoes to the United States before space would be limited.8  In 
2010, that number dropped to six percent.9  With recent increases in 
domestic production from shale and conventional sources, “[n]atural gas 
prices have declined and imports of LNG have significantly declined.”10   
Nonetheless, the DWPA accomplished its goal.  There are three 
deepwater LNG ports in operation today, albeit at low capacities, another 
three approved but not yet under construction, and a handful more in the 
application stage (or with pending and proposed applications).11  Given 
the lack of a significant domestic market for imported LNG, the 
overcapacity of existing ports and land-based terminals, and an evolving 
natural gas outlook, the DWPA may not be invoked for another LNG 
port for a long while, but we still have active applications with 
significant safety and environmental concerns and a growing LNG 
exports market.  In this article, Part I is a short introduction to LNG, Part 
II is a walkthrough of the most significant aspects of the DWPA and 
deepwater port management, Part III is a discussion of the public safety, 
environmental, and climate concerns arising from LNG trade, and Part 
IV is a discussion of the current LNG domestic marketplace and trends 
for the near-term future.  
II.  LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS PRIMER 
LNG is natural gas that has been cooled into a liquid for storage or 
transport.12  LNG, over 600 times more compressed than gaseous-state 
                                            
 8. See North American LNG Import Terminals: Existing, OFFICE OF ENERGY 
PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N [hereinafter Existing LNG Facilities],  
available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/ indus-act/ lng/LNG-existing.pdf; see 
also U.S. Natural Gas Imports By Country, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/ dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_a.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter U.S. Natural Gas Imports]. 
 9. Existing LNG Facilities, supra note 8. 
10. The Department of Energy’s Role in Liquefied Natural Gas Export Applications: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., 112th Cong. 5 (2011) 
[hereinafter DOE Testimony] (statement of Christopher Smith, Deputy  Assistant 
Secretary for Oil and Natural Gas Office of Fossil Energy, U.S. Department of Energy), 
available at http://energy.senate.gov/public/_files/SmithDOETestimony110811.pdf. 
 11. Deepwater Port Licensing Program:  Approved Applications and Operational 
Facilities, U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSP. MAR. ADMIN., http://www.marad.dot.gov/ 
ports_landing_page/deepwater_port_licensing/dwp_current_ports/dwp_current_ports.htm 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011). 
 12. Role of LNG, supra note 2. 
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natural gas, must be cooled to almost -260ºF.13  In its compressed, 
colorless, odorless, and liquid form, LNG can be pumped into tankers 
and shipped around the world.14 
Since 1969, the United States has been a player in this market, 
exporting from 1999-2009 an average of over 57 billion cubic feet (Bcf) 
of LNG per year from a Kenai, Alaska port to Japan, at an average price 
of $5.39 per thousand cubic feet (tcf).15  The United States has also been 
an importer of LNG, though at various intensities.  In the mid- to late-
1980s, the United States imported on average just under seventeen Bcf 
per year (at $3.54 per tcf), but those levels increased sharply in the 1990s 
to almost seventy-one Bcf per year (at a less expensive $2.58 per tcf).16  
This over-four-fold increase in LNG imports was exceeded by the import 
boom in the 2000s where the nation’s imports rose to an average of 464 
Bcf per year—an almost seven-fold increase over the 1990s levels.17   
Overall, “world liquefaction capacity [is expected to increase] 2.4-
fold, from about 8 trillion cubic feet in 2007 to 19 in 2035.”18  The 
number of liquefaction and regasification facilities worldwide is 
exploding, as is the number of vessels transporting LNG, and pipelines 
delivering gas to power plants and storage tanks.  The manner in which 
the United States plays a role in this market and regulates, promotes, or 
prioritizes its coastal deepwater ports can make or break the U.S. marine 
environment.  
III.  FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW OF LNG FACILITIES 
A.  The Deepwater Port Act 
The federal DWPA, as amended in 2002 by President Bush, is the 
principle law governing offshore port facilities for the importation and 
transport of oil or natural gas to or from the United States’ Outer 
                                            
 13. Id. 
 14. Liquefied Natural Gas, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY, 
http://www.fossil.energy.gov/programs/oilgas/storage/index.html (last visited Oct. 1, 
2011). 
 15. See U.S. Natural Gas Exports by Point of Exit, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/NG_MOVE_POE2_DCU_YENA-NJA_A.htm (last visited 
Oct. 1, 2011). 
 16. See U.S. Natural Gas Imports, supra note 8.  
 17. See id. 
 18. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 3 (2010), 
[hereinafter ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010], available at 
http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/archive/ieo10/pdf/0484(2010).pdf.  
2011] Deepwater Liquefied Natural Gas Ports 5 
 
Continental Shelf (OCS).19  The DWPA, in order to provide for the 
protection of the marine and coastal environment, while fostering the 
free movement of oil and gas, establishes a licensing program for oil and 
gas ports located in the OCS that is jointly run (at various stages) by the 
Maritime Administration and the USCG.20  While the DWPA applies to 
oil and gas deepwater ports, the focus of this article is on the LNG 
facilities. 
The DWPA was designed to “promote the construction and operation 
of deepwater ports as a safe and effective means of importing oil or 
natural gas into the United States . . . .”21  In 2002, the DWPA was 
amended to support a growing need for LNG import facilities by 
requiring that, absent certain deficiencies in information, the licensing 
process only take 330 days once an application is deemed complete.22   
The 2002 amendment also provided that liquefied natural gas facilities 
will be given “top priority” for license processing “[t]o promote the 
energy security of the United States.”23  To date, the DWPA has only 
been invoked for a handful of completed and operational LNG facilities 
in the U.S.—one in the Gulf of Mexico and two near Boston.24  Two 
other proposed ports for the Gulf of Mexico have been approved but are 
not yet under construction.25   
B.  Overlapping Jurisdictions 
In the licensing procedures for deepwater LNG ports, from proposal 
to approval, three agencies play significant and overlapping roles.  The 
lead agency for the ultimate port licensing decision is the MARAD 
Deepwater Port Licensing Program.26  MARAD is responsible for final 
decisions concerning proposals, licenses, construction, operation, and 
                                            
 19. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (2006).   
 20. See id. § 1503.  
 21. Id. § 1501(a)(5). 
 22. Id. § 1504. 
 23. Id. § 1503(i). 
 24. Deepwater Port Licensing Program, Approved Applications and Operational 
Facilities, U.S. DEP’T TRANSPORTATION MAR. ADMIN., www.marad.dot.gov/ 
ports_landing_page/deepwater_port_licensing/dwp_current_ports/dwp_current_ports.htm 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2011) (Gulf Gateway Energy Bridge, Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, 
Neptune LNG, and Northeast Gateway).   
 25. Id. (Port Dolphin and Main Pass Energy Hub). 
 26. See 33 U.S.C. § 1503(b).  MARAD has been delegated the Secretary of 
Transportation’s authority under the DWPA.  68 Fed. Reg. 36496 (June 18, 2003) (to be 
codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1).  
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decommissioning.27  The USCG is responsible for promulgating the 
regulations MARAD uses in its decision-making and is the lead agency 
responsible for all environmental decisions and studies under the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).28   
FERC is the agency responsible for an entirely separate licensing 
process for all onshore facilities supporting the deepwater port (e.g., 
pipelines and hub interconnections), and all DWPA applicants must file a 
separate application to FERC for a certificate of public convenience and 
necessity for those supporting facilities.29  FERC also acts as a liaison 
with the Department of Energy for the approval of any import or export 
permits.30  In order to ensure that the entire port project (from the port to 
the mainline gas hubs) is environmentally reviewed as a whole, the 
USCG’s NEPA determination covers both the offshore port and the 
FERC-jurisdiction onshore pipelines.31   
C.  Permit Issuance Conditions 
The DWPA contains numerous specific conditions on the issuance of 
port licenses.  Foremost among those conditions is that DWPA port 
licenses must “provide for the protection of the marine and coastal 
environment to prevent or minimize any adverse impact which might 
occur as a consequence of the development of such ports.”32  As such, the 
decision on whether to issue a license for a port requires a finding that a 
port proposal is consistent with national environmental quality objectives 
and has the best available technology in place to prevent or minimize 
adverse marine environment impacts.33  
Beyond the environmental, there are other significant permit 
issuance conditions in the DWPA.  First, MARAD must make a finding 
that the applicant is willing to, and financially capable of, complying 
                                            
 27. Id. § 1503(b), (e). 
 28. See 33 C.F.R. §§ 148-150. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (2006).  FERC is also the lead permitting agency for onshore 
LNG facilities, of which there are many more than there are deepwater ports.  See id. § 
717b(e).  
 30. Id. § 717b(a).  
 31. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(f) (“[NEPA] compliance shall fulfill the requirement of all 
Federal agencies in carrying out their responsibilities under [NEPA] pursuant to” the 
chapter on deepwater ports). See also 76 Fed.Reg. 4417 (Jan. 25, 2011) (designating the 
USCG as the lead agency for NEPA review of the Liberty Natural Gas LNG port and 
FERC-jurisdiction pipeline connections). 
 32. 33 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2). 
 33. Id. § 1503(c)(5). 
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“with applicable laws, regulations, and license conditions.”34  Second, the 
port must be deemed consistent with the national interest and national 
security (including energy security) goals.35  Third, the port cannot 
burden commerce by unreasonably interfering with navigation, shipping 
lanes, or other uses, during construction, operation, and 
decommissioning.36  Fourth, MARAD must consult with the Secretaries 
of the Army, State, and Defense, and must not have been told by the 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that the 
port will violate the Clean Air, Clean Water, or Marine Protection, 
Research and Sanctuaries Acts.37   
Finally, MARAD must check on two state-based conditions before 
issuing a permit.  First, the state to which the port is directly connected 
(by pipeline or other facilities) must have, or be working toward, “an 
approved coastal zone management program pursuant to the Coastal 
Zone Management Act.”38  For the purposes of this coastal zone program 
requirement, the state must have or be working toward a program for the 
specific area in which the deepwater port will be located, not necessarily 
for the entire state.39  Second, MARAD cannot approve a port without 
the consent or presumptive consent of the governor of the adjacent 
coastal state.40 
D.  NEPA and the Deepwater Port Act “Clock” 
NEPA, a law fundamentally designed to inform the public and 
government decision-makers of the environmental impacts of proposed 
projects, is given a time-sensitive role in deepwater port licensing.  This 
important aspect of environmental review, though, must be completed 
within a short timeframe.  
                                            
 34. Id. § 1503(c)(1)-(2). 
 35. Id. § 1503(c)(3). 
 36. Id. § 1503(c)(4). 
 37. Id. § 1503(c)(6)-(7).  The EPA Administrator is required to communicate whether 
the port as proposed will violate those acts within forty-five days of the last public 
hearing.  Id.  Consultations with the three named Secretaries do not have to reach any 
specificity–MARAD must only consult with them “to determine their views on the 
adequacy of the application, and its effect on programs within their respective 
jurisdictions.”  Id. 
 38. Id. § 1503(c)(9). Alaska withdrew its coastal zone management program as of July 
1, 2011, making it the only coastal U.S. state with OCS water that cannot be given a 
deepwater port (though it can, and does, still have an onshore LNG terminal under the 
Natural Gas Act and FERC rules). See 76 Fed.Reg. 39857, 39858 (July 7, 2011). 
 39. Id. § 1508(c). 
 40. Id. § 1503(c)(8).  See also, infra Part II(e). 
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NEPA requires, in part, that agencies consider alternatives to 
proposed projects (e.g., alternative routes, alternative designs, or 
alternative locations) and consider the long-term cumulative impacts of 
the project.41  If a project is found to have a significant environmental 
impact, the permitting/licensing agency must prepare an Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS) analyzing the project’s expected impacts.42  The 
EIS process involves several steps of public input, comment, and 
participation.43  Because the NEPA process has the potential to delay port 
construction while costly environmental analyses are conducted and 
publicly reviewed, the DWPA requires that all NEPA compliance (and 
indeed all public hearings under the DWPA) be concluded within 240 
days of an applications’ official acceptance by MARAD.44  This 240-day 
period is the middle phase of the DWPA “clock.” 
The DWPA “clock” is a three-step timeline statutorily imposed on 
deepwater port agencies designed to rapidly bring an application from 
submission to license approval.  First, upon submission of an application, 
MARAD has 26 days to make and publish notice of a completeness 
determination.45  An application is deemed complete when it meets a 
variety of standards found in the DWPA and implementing regulations 
that range from engineering designs to risk and hazard analyses.46  In 
making this decision, MARAD consults with the USCG, FERC, and any 
other federal agencies that have expertise relevant to a port’s 
environmental or economic impacts.47   
Second, the USCG has 240 days to work through all the steps of 
NEPA and all the necessary public hearings for the port proposal.48  
Within this second phase, the USCG must also hold at least one hearing 
in each declared adjacent coastal state.49  For NEPA compliance, scoping 
meetings and hearings for the draft and final versions of any 
environmental assessments or impact statements must also be held.50  
Any of the hearings for DWPA, NEPA, or any other statute requirements 
can “if not otherwise prohibited . . . be consolidated”—meaning that the 
final hearing for an EIS can count as one of the mandatory adjacent 
                                            
 41. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(e) (2006). 
 42. 40 C.F.R. § 6207(a) (2010).  
 43. Id. § 6207(d). 
 44. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(g). 
 45. Id. § 1504(c)(1). 
 46. See id. § 1504(c)(2); see also 33 C.F.R. § 148.105 (2010). 
 47. Licensing MOU, supra note 6, art. IV(A)(2).  
 48. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(g). 
 49. Id. § 1504(g); see also 33 C.F.R. § 148.222(a). 
 50. See 40 C.F.R. § 6.203 (2010).  
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coastal state hearings for the USCG and the final MARAD hearing for 
the port itself.51 
Third, 90 days are allotted for last-minute state and agency input and 
final MARAD decision making.52  Governors of adjacent coastal states53 
are allowed one last opportunity to approve, approve with conditions, or 
disapprove of the application, but they must communicate their position 
no later than forty-five days after the last public hearing on the DWPA 
and NEPA processes.54  For federal agencies, recommendations as to 
whether to accept or reject the port application and any other “comments 
. . . must be received by the [USCG] within forty-five days after the close 
of the public hearing period . . . .”55  MARAD must make its final license 
determination and issue a record of decision within the ninety days 
(inclusive of the forty-five day deadline for agency and state comments) 
following the final public hearing.56   
In practice, however, the applications do not see a regular 356-day 
turnaround.  “The Coast Guard, in concurrence with MARAD, can 
suspend the [‘clock’] if an applicant fails to provide timely information 
or requests additional time to comply with a request.”57  The USCG has 
the authority to request a wide variety of additional information, new 
analyses, or explanations as the Commandant sees fit.58  For example, the 
application clock for Liberty Natural Gas’s deepwater port (detailed 
below) was suspended 33 days into the NEPA review period (step two of 
the clock) so that the applicant could provide more financial information, 
ichthyoplankton assessments, and further NEPA analyses on alternatives 
and the needs of the port.59 
                                            
 51. 33 C.F.R. § 148.222(a). 
 52. See 33 U.S.C. § 1504(i)(4). 
 53. Id. § 1508(a)(1) (defining adjacent coastal state as “any coastal State which (A) 
would be directly connected by pipeline to a deepwater port as proposed in an 
application, or (B) would be located within 15 miles of any such proposed deepwater 
port”). 
 54. Id. § 1508(b)(1). 
 55. 33 C.F.R. § 148.277(b). See also 33 U.S.C. § 1504(e)(2). 
 56. Id. § 148.276(c). 
 57. See id. § 148.276(a). 
 58. Id. § 148.107(a).  
 59. Letter from M.A. Prescott, Chief, Deepwater Ports Standards Div. and H. Keith 
Lesnick, Assoc. Adm’r Intermodal Sys. Dev., to Jason Goldstin, CEO Liberty Natural 
Gas (Dec. 30, 2010), available at www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=USCG-
2010-0993-003.  
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E.  Adjacent Coastal States and the Governor Veto 
Perhaps most importantly, the DWPA was built to “protect the 
interests of . . . adjacent coastal States” and the “rights and 
responsibilities of States and communities to regulate growth, determine 
land use, and otherwise protect the environment . . . .”60   To that end, 
“[a] license may not be issued under the DWPA unless the governor of 
an adjacent coastal state approves the issuance of the license.”61   
i.  Determining Adjacent Coastal States and Atlantic Sea Island 
Group v. Connaughton 
Under the DWPA, an adjacent coastal state (ACS) is a state that is 
either directly connected to a proposed port by pipeline or other facility, 
or is within fifteen miles of the proposed location of the port.62  The 
authority to declare a state to be an ACS lies with MARAD, though with 
the rigid definition set forth in the DWPA, there is not much room for 
interpretation–either a port is within fifteen miles of a state or connected 
by a pipeline or it is not.63  Flexibility in determining whether a state is 
“adjacent” to a port proposal is located in another section of the DWPA 
that allows states not “designated” as adjacent by MARAD to apply for 
that status.64  In those cases, MARAD can declare a state as “adjacent” if 
it “determines that there is a risk of damage to the coastal environment of 
such State equal to or greater than the risk posed to” an ACS that meets 
the rigid statutory test of connectivity or fifteen miles.65  Requests to add 
adjacent coastal states, if a state has not been declared as such by 
MARAD, can only be made by a state (not by individuals or 
organizations) and must be done within the first two weeks after the port 
application is made public, with a final MARAD determination coming 
no later than forty-five days after receiving that request.66   
In one of the only cases based on the DWPA, Atlantic Sea Island 
Group v. Connaughton, the timeline of a state’s request to be granted 
ACS status, and the basis upon which MARAD can grant that request, 
were tested in court.67  The Atlantic Sea Island Group (ASIG) LNG port, 
                                            
 60. 33 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(3)-(4). 
 61. Id. § 1503(c)(8); id. 1508 § (b)(1).  
62.  Id.  § 1508(a)(1). 
 63. See id. § 1508(a)(1). 
 64. Id. § 1508(a)(2). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. 592 F. Supp. 2d. 1 (D.D.C. 2008).  
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dubbed “Safe Harbor,” was a proposed artificial island to be “located 
approximately 13.5 miles off the coast of New York and 19 miles off the 
coast of New Jersey.”68  Sited in a location where no island can be found, 
the proposal would have covered 116 acres of seafloor at the base of an 
entirely-filled-in island.69   
With an application deemed complete on August 27, 2007, MARAD 
declared New York as an ACS and the official DWPA “clock” started to 
run.70  The fourteen-day window for a state to apply to be considered as 
an ACS also began to run, within which the Governor of New Jersey 
timely submitted a letter asking for such on September 6, 2007.71  After 
consultations with other federal agencies and the State of New Jersey, 
MARAD “designated New Jersey as an additional adjacent coastal state 
for the Safe Harbor Port” on November 2, 2007.72  After objections by 
the applicant ASIG, the MARAD made a final decision in a letter dated  
February 8, 2008, affirming New Jersey’s status as an ACS because New 
Jersey’s risks of damage to the coastal environment was equal to or 
greater than that of New York.73   
Based on the final MARAD decision to declare New Jersey an ACS, 
ASIG filed a motion to enjoin MARAD and the USCG from acting on 
the ACS determination.74  ASIG’s complaint, in part, was based on the 
theory that MARAD decision to make New Jersey an ACS came beyond 
the forty-five day statutory timeline.75  
Before reaching the question of timeliness, the court had to first 
determine whether the letter approving New Jersey’s request to become 
an ACS was a reviewable final agency action.  According to the court, 
“[a]n agency action is a ‘final agency action’ reviewable under the APA 
if it ‘mark[s] the consummation of the agency’s decision making 
process’ and it is an action ‘by which rights or obligations have been 
determined, or from which legal consequences flow.’”76  Under the 
DWPA, notes the court, legal consequences flow from an ACS 
                                            
 68. Id. at 4. 
 69. ATL. SEA ISLAND GRP., SAFE HARBOR ENERGY PROJECT DEEPWATER PORT LICENSE 
APPLICATION VOL. THREE, PART ONE, TOPIC REPORT THREE, BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES, 3-
50 (2007) [hereinafter SAFE HARBOR ENERGY, BIOLOGICAL REPORT]. 
 70. Safe Harbor Energy Liquified Natural Gas Deepwater Port License Application, 
72 Fed. Reg. 49,041, 49,041 (Aug. 27, 2007). 
 71. Atlantic Sea Island Grp., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 4. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1508(a)(2) (2006). 
 74. Atlantic Sea Island Grp., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 4-5. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 8 (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997)). 
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determination including in-state hearings, approval authority, and other 
rights.77 Therefore, deciding in a letter submitted to the public docket that 
New Jersey is an ACS, is an action by which rights have been 
determined.  The step “marks the consummation of the agency’s decision 
making process with respect to the scope of New Jersey’s role in the 
issuance of ASIG’s license and is a decision which determines New 
Jersey’s rights [and thus] . . . is a reviewable final agency action.”78 
Turning to the issue of whether this reviewable final agency action 
was made within the forty-five day timeline established in the DWPA, 
the court ruled that, absent a penalty for non-compliance, the timeline 
was merely directory.  As noted above, the DWPA mandates that 
MARAD “shall make the [ACS] designation . . . not later than the forty-
fifth day after the date he receives such a request from a state.”79  The 
project docket showed MARAD received the New Jersey request on 
September 10, 2007, and ASIG argued that, therefore, a decision should 
have been made by October 25, 2007.80  Citing precedent, the ASIG 
court “concluded that statutory time limits for which there is no 
accompanying statutorily prescribed consequence should generally be 
viewed as ‘directory,’ rather than mandatory and an agency is not barred 
from acting outside the prescribed time period.”81  Given the lack of 
DWPA consequence for decisions reached after forty-five days, the court 
held that MARAD’s ACS decision was legally valid.82 
The second major theory in the ASIG complaint was that MARAD 
“did not apply the standard for designating an adjacent coastal state” 
found in the DWPA, and that “the factual record does not support the 
conclusion that New Jersey is an adjacent coastal state.”83  Under the 
DWPA, MARAD “can designate an additional adjacent coastal state, ‘if 
[the agency] determines that there is a risk of damage to the coastal 
environment of such State equal to or greater than the risk posed to a 
State directly connected by pipeline to the proposed deepwater port.”84  
“Coastal environment,” under the DWPA “includes transitional and 
intertidal areas, bays, lagoons, salt marshes, estuaries, and beaches; the 
fish, wildlife and other living resources thereof; and the recreational and 
                                            
 77. Id. at 5-6. 
 78. Id. at 8.  
 79. 33 U.S.C. § 1508(a)(2) (2006).  
 80. Atlantic Sea Island Grp., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 11-12. 
 81. Id. at 12. See, e.g., Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 260 (1986); Gottlieb v. 
Pena, 41 F.3d 730, 733-36 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 82. Atlantic Sea Island Grp., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
 83. Id. at 4. 
 84. Id. at 14 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1508(a)(2)). 
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scenic values of such lands, waters and resources.”85  Beyond this 
guidance, however, the DWPA is silent as to how MARAD “must arrive 
at [a] determination of the comparative risk posed to the coastal 
environments” of the ACS and ACS-designation requester.86   
Without statutory guidance, MARAD used “‘an equitable approach’ 
that ‘evaluates the totality of impacts.’”87  The court determined that its 
role was simply to “determine whether [MARAD] considered the 
available evidence and reached a decision that is rationally related to the 
facts contained in the record.”88  Under this test, the court looked at 
MARAD’s decision making process.  Among many factors considered, 
MARAD looked at the shared environmental and economic concerns 
between New Jersey and New York (the existing ACS), ocean currents, 
aesthetics and viewsheds, construction and decommissioning staging 
areas, and the risk of explosion.89 MARAD also considered statements 
by the state of New Jersey and environmental coalition Clean Ocean 
Action that “asserted that the proposed port’s location would interfere 
with the Port of New Jersey and prime fishing areas.”90  Based on all of 
these factors noted on the record by MARAD, the court held that 
MARAD’s conclusion (that New Jersey’s coastal environment was at 
equal or greater risk than New York’s) “was not arbitrary or capricious” 
and upheld the decision.91 
From Atlantic Sea Island Group therefore, several lessons were 
learned about the DWPA and ACS determinations.  First, because the act 
of declaring which state is an ACS carries with it legal significance, a 
letter declaring a state to be an ACS is a reviewable final agency 
action—even if the larger port application process is ongoing.  Second, 
where the DWPA contains no penalties for acting outside of statutorily-
defined timelines, those timelines should be deemed “directory.”  As the 
ASIG court notes, the appropriate remedy in most cases is not to remove 
jurisdiction, it is to compel action.92  Third, and finally, when a state 
applies to be designated an ACS, MARAD’s use of an “equitable 
approach” in examining comparative harm to coastal environments is 
valid.  The evidence that MARAD should use in these examinations 
                                            
 85. 33 U.S.C. § 1502(5).   
 86. Atlantic Sea Island Grp., 592 F. Supp. 2d at 14. 
 87. Id. at 14. 
 88. Id. at 15. 
 89. Id. at 14-15. 
 90. Id. at 15. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 12. 
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seems to be open-ended and can, or should, cover economic, aesthetic, 
and environmental impacts.  
ii.  Benefits, and Drawbacks, of ACS Status 
Becoming a declared ACS provides a governor with significant 
leverage over a deepwater port proposal.   The ACS has unfettered 
access to any port proposals: “not later than 10 days after the designation 
of [an ACS] . . . , the Secretary shall transmit a complete copy of the 
application to the Governor.”93  An ACS can “fix reasonable fees for the 
use of a deepwater port facility, and . . . land-based facilities directly 
related to a deepwater port facility,” but such fees can only cover 
expenses borne by the state in dealing with those facilities.94  At a 
minimum, at least one hearing on the port licensing must be held in each 
declared ACS.95   Chief among the benefits, though, is the fact that 
MARAD cannot “issue a license without the approval of the Governor of 
each [ACS].”96  Indeed, as noted above (Section III.D), the Governor of 
an ACS can deny an application at any point before the end of the forty-
five day period following the last public hearing on a proposal.97  
This ACS authority to approve or deny a proposed port is not 
without qualification or consequence.  MARAD can overrule a 
disapproval which is based solely on environmental protection, coastal 
zone, or land and water use interests (if the application would have 
otherwise been approved by MARAD).98  In such an instance, MARAD 
is mandated to “condition the license granted so as to make it consistent 
with” those concerns.99   
For example, the Main Pass Energy Hub LNG port planned for the 
Gulf of Mexico ran into ACS opposition from the then-Governor of 
Louisiana Kathleen Blanco.  In a letter dated May 5, 2006, Governor 
Blanco invoked the DWPA in issuing an official “disapproval” of the 
application.100  The Governor’s chief concern stemmed from the 
potentially harmful effects of the planned once-through cooling system, 
                                            
 93. 33 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(1) (2006). 
 94. Id. § 1504(h)(2). 
 95. Id. § 1504(g). 
 96. Id. § 1508(b)(1). 
 97. Id. § 1508(a)(1). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Letter from Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of La., to Julie A. Nelson, 
Acting Deputy Mar. Admin. and Chief Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Transp. (May 5, 2006) 
(regarding USCG 2004-17696-321).  
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and she called for revenue-sharing.101  In a reply dated May 18, 2006, just 
thirteen days later, MARAD overruled the disapproval by working with 
the applicant to make the project consistent with the once-through 
cooling concerns.102  MARAD noted that the applicant was switching to 
closed-cycle cooling (which addressed the environmental protection 
concerns), and that revenue-sharing was outside the scope of the 
“reasonable fees” portion of the DWPA and was therefore an illegitimate 
basis for the disapproval.103   
In practice, however, ACS disapprovals can be based on just 
environmental concerns and still be determinative.  In the mid-2000s, a 
proposal to build an LNG port in California, called the Cabrillo Port, 
faced opposition from then-Governor Schwarzenegger.  After going 
through several years of delays, including a two-year “clock” stoppage to 
fill data gaps, a final hearing (that doubled as a final EIS hearing) was 
held on the project on April 4, 2007.104  Based on the port’s 
environmental impacts, the Governor issued a letter disapproving the 
project.105  In that letter, the Governor cited the air pollution impacts of 
the port (including 30 tons per year of NOx, 11 tons of particulate matter, 
and 39 tons of organic gases), and the impacts on marine life 
(temperature and ballast water impacts to the local ecosystem).106  
Despite the availability of its statutory override for disapprovals based 
solely on environmental concerns, MARAD decided, ultimately, to 
accept the Governor’s disapproval and not condition the permit as they 
had done with the Main Pass LNG port in Louisiana in 2006.107 
Finally, if a Governor fails to transmit a decision by the forty-fifth 
day after the last public hearing, either in favor of or against a project, 
“approval shall be conclusively presumed.”108  In Alabama, in 2010, the 
TORP port application was delayed, in the final stages of approval, by 
the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and Governor Bob Riley’s veto 
                                            
 101. Id. 
 102. See Letter from Julie A. Nelson, Acting Deputy Mar. Admin. and Chief Counsel, 
U.S. Dept. of Transp., to Kathleen Babineaux Blanco, Governor of La., (May 18, 2006) 
(regarding USCG 2004-17696-321). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Secretary’s Decision on Deepwater Port License Application of BHP Billiton 
LNG International, Inc., U.S. Dept. of Transp. (June 5, 2007) [hereinafter Cabrillo Port] 
(regarding USCG-2004-16877-1265).  
 105. Letter from Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of Cal., to Sean T. Connaughton, 
Mar. Admin., U.S. Dept. of Transp. (May 18, 2007) (regarding USCG-2004-16877-
1265). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Cabrillo Port, supra note 104. 
 108. 33 U.S.C. § 1508(b)(1) (2006). 
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authority was almost considered officially waived.109  Under the original 
timeline for the application, the deadline for ACS governor intervention 
was May 17, 2010, but MARAD granted an extension of thirty days 
(through June 16, 2010), “in light of the recent catastrophic oil spill 
event.”110  According to MARAD, should they “not receive [the 
Governor’s] decision by that date, [his] approval of the application will 
be presumed to have been granted.”111  A few days before the June 16 
deadline, Governor Riley asked MARAD for an extension of 120 days.112  
MARAD, in turn, granted a ninety day extension, given that “no further 
extensions” would be allowed, after which, again approval would be 
conclusively presumed.113  After the full ninety days, on September 14, 
2010, Governor Riley officially approved the TORP Project—narrowly 
avoiding a waiver of his approval/disapproval right.114   
IV.  PUBLIC SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL, AND CLIMATE CONCERNS 
In deciding whether to grant a license for a deepwater port, federal 
agencies review a host of impact analyses and operational plans.  Chief 
among the concerns for environmental and public interest practitioners 
are the public safety, environmental, and lifecycle carbon footprint 
impacts that LNG ports can cause.   
A.  Protection of Public Safety 
Due to the compressed, volatile nature of LNG, the siting of 
deepwater ports, justifiably, raises many public safety concerns.  In a 
2003 government report, the Congressional Research Service concluded 
that LNG is a hazardous fuel that “poses a serious hazard of explosion or 
fire.”115  If located near population centers, such an explosive hazard 
                                            
 109. Letter from David Matsuda, Acting Mar. Admin., U.S. Dept. of Transp., to Bob 
Riley, Governor of Ala. (May 17, 2010) (regarding USCG-2006-24644-0789). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Letter from Bob Riley, Governor of Ala., to David Matsuda, Acting Mar. Admin., 
U.S. Dept. of Transp. (June 13, 2010) (regarding USCG-2006-24644-0790). 
 113. Letter from David Matsuda, Acting Mar. Admin., U.S. Dept. of Transp., to Bob 
Riley, Governor of Ala. (June 16, 2010) (regarding USCG-2006-24644-0791).  
 114. Letter from Bob Riley, Governor of Ala., to David Matsuda, Acting Mar. Admin., 
U.S. Dept. of Transp. (Sept. 14, 2010) (regarding USCG-2006-24644-0794).  
 115. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS (LNG) 
INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS, Library of 
Congress Order Code RL 32073, at 8 (Sept. 9, 2003), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/lng/documents/CRS_RPT_LNG_INFRA_SECURITY.PDF.  
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“can be vulnerable to terrorist attack.”116    The primary source of this 
explosion concern is not a whole-tanker LNG eruption, but a “pool 
fire”—a fire that spreads over the water near a LNG tanker breach and 
burns “far more hotly and rapidly than oil or gasoline fires.”117  These 
fires are so intensely hot that “their thermal radiation may injure people 
and damage property a considerable distance from the fire itself.”118  
Impacts from pool fires, “[i]n the worst-case scenario . . . could kill 
people half a mile away and cause second-degree burns at 1.6 miles,” 
according to reports included in a Florida LNG deepwater port 
application.119 
To protect against these and other risks, USCG regulations provide 
for the establishment of a series of zones around deepwater ports.  
“Safety zones, no anchoring areas, . . . and areas to be avoided . . . are 
established to promote safety of life and property, marine environmental 
protection, and navigational safety at deepwater ports and adjacent 
waters.”120  The only federally-regulated area, the “safety zone,” is a 
concentric circle around a port where all vessels not associated with the 
port (LNG tankers or USCG ships) “are prohibited from entering into or 
moving within this safety zone.”121  “[B]y preventing or controlling 
specific activities,” safety zones protect the living resources of the sea 
and nearby communities from harm.122  
Other zones not directly regulated by the federal government must be 
established in the ocean around deepwater ports.123  “No Anchoring 
Areas” (NAAs), as their name indicates, are areas where no anchoring is 
allowed.124  The mapping and implementation of an NAA, which is 
“specifically established to protect vessels in transit and sub-surface 
deepwater port components,” is mandatory.125  The last official safety 
zone are the “Areas To Be Avoided” (ATBAs), “a recommendatory 
                                            
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. David Fleshler, Floating Gas Plant Proposal Off Fort Lauderdale ‘Crazy Idea’, 
SUN-SENTINEL (FLORIDA), May 17, 2008, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-05-
17/news/0805160480_1_gas-plant-natural-gas-coast-guard. 
 120. 33 C.F.R. § 150.905(a) (2010).  
 121. Safety Zone; Gulf Gateway Deepwater Port, Gulf of Mexico, 70 Fed. Reg. 24707, 
24708 (May 11, 2005). 
 122. 33 C.F.R. § 150.905(b).  
 123. “The NAAs and [Areas to be Avoided] are established via the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO).” Id. § 150.905(c).  
 124. Safety Zone; Gulf Gateway Deepwater Port, Gulf of Mexico, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
24707.  
 125. 33 C.F.R. § 150.905(c). 
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routing measure” that does not restrict vessels from transiting the area.126  
Vessel operators, as the area’s moniker implies, “are strongly urged to 
seek alternate routes outside the ATBA.”127  In addition to zones for 
LNG terminals, there are safety zones around LNG tankers that move 
with the tankers when they are in transit.   
Safety zones, NAAs, and ATBAs have no specified size—the area is 
instead determined during the DWPA license application process by the 
USCG.128  Under USCG’s deepwater port regulations, “sizes of restricted 
areas will be the minimum size needed to ensure safety, while at the 
same time considering potential impacts on other activities, including 
recreational boating, fishing, and OCS activity.”129  Among the factors to 
be considered are: tanker size; vessel traffic, volume, direction, and flow; 
shipping lanes; proximity to fishing and oil and gas production areas; 
environmental and economic impacts of the zones; and any pre-existing 
local agreements, customs, or practices.130   
The safety zones, NAAs, and ATBAs for each of the four approved 
and built deepwater ports are established in the USCG DWPA 
regulations.131  For the three established LNG deepwater ports, Neptune 
(Massachusetts), Northeast Gateway (Massachusetts), and Gulf Gateway 
(Louisiana), the USCG has established circular safety zones with a 500 
meter radius around each of the port’s primary offloading components.132  
The two Massachusetts ports have 1,000 meter radius circular NAAs and 
very specifically designated rhomboidal ATBAs, whereas the Gulf 
Gateway port has a 1,500 meter radius NAA and a simple 2,000 meter 
radius ATBA.133  The more constrained NAAs and ATBAs in the 
Massachusetts ports may be a result of the traditionally heavy vessel 
traffic and fishing in the vicinity of those ports—a larger exclusionary 
zone may have had too much potential to cause adverse economic 
impacts to existing marine uses.  
                                            
 126. Id. 
 127. Safety Zone; Gulf Gateway Deepwater Port, Gulf of Mexico, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
24707. 
 128. 33 C.F.R. § 150.915(a).  For NAAs and ATBAs, the federal government, acting 
through the USCG, proposes the zones to the IMO for approval.  See id. § 150.915(c).  
 129. Id. § 150.905(d). 
 130. Id. § 150.915(b). 
 131. Id. § 150.940(a)-(d). 
 132. Id. § 150.940 (b)(1), (c)(1); Regulated Navigation Areas, Safety Zones, Security 
Zones; Deepwater Ports in Boston Captain of the Port Zone, MA, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,374, 
51,376-77 (Aug. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. § 150.940(d)(1)).  
 133. 33 C.F.R. § 150.940 (b)(1)(i)-(ii), (c)(2)-(3); Regulated Navigation Areas, Safety 
Zones, Security Zones; Deepwater Ports in Boston Captain of the Port Zone, MA, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 51,376-77.  
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B.  Environmental Review and Ecological Impacts 
From impacts to marine mammals and fisheries to habitat destruction 
and water pollution, deepwater LNG ports can significantly affect the 
surrounding environment.  As noted above, Congress requires that 
DWPA port licenses “provide for the protection of the marine and 
coastal environment to prevent or minimize any adverse impact which 
might occur as a consequence of the development of such ports.”134  To 
accomplish this protection, the USCG and MARAD must, for all 
applications, examine the effect of the port and its shoreside facilities on 
the environment for all aspects of the project from construction to 
decommissioning.135  In reviewing the environmental impact of a 
deepwater port, agencies must analyze:  
(1) the effect on the environment, including but not limited to: (i) 
[i]mpacts on endangered species; (ii) [e]ssential fish habitat; (iii) 
[m]arine sanctuaries; (iv) [a]rchaeological, cultural and historic 
sites; (v) [w]ater and air; (vi) [c]oastal zone management; (vii) 
[c]oastal barrier resources; and (viii) [w]etlands and flood plains; 
(2) the effect on oceanographic currents and wave patterns; (3) 
the potential risks to a deepwater port from waves, winds, 
weather, and geological conditions, and the steps that can be 
taken to protect against or minimize these dangers; and (4) the 
effect on human health and welfare, including socioeconomic 
impacts, environmental justice and protection of children from 
environmental health and safety risks.136 
Before MARAD can make a final decision to approve a deepwater port, 
an applicant must show that “the deepwater port will be fabricated, 
constructed, operated, and decommissioned using the best available 
technology to prevent or minimize adverse impacts” on these 
environmental factors.137  
Among other requirements for deepwater port review, applicants 
must comply with local and state land and coastal zone use rules, 
minimize impacts on environmental justice communities, preserve 
wetlands, and avoid interfering with cultural or historic preservation 
initiatives.138  Finally, there are over fifty environmental statutes and 
                                            
 134. 33 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2). 
 135. 33 C.F.R. § 148.707(a)-(b).  
 136. Id. § 148.707(b)(1)-(4). 
 137. Id. § 148.710(a)(2). 
 138. Id. §§ 148.715(b), 148.730-148.735. 
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executive orders enumerated in the regulations that an application must 
comply with, ranging from the Abandoned Shipwreck Act139 to the Wild 
and Scenic Rivers Act,140 and everything in between.141  In practice, the 
difference between preventing adverse environmental impacts and 
fulfilling a statutory duty to minimize such impacts is significant.   
Off the Massachusetts coast, the Northeast Gateway LNG port was 
approved despite the conclusion in a final environmental impact review 
that port operations would harass 731 dolphins and whales per year.142  
The National Marine Fisheries Service northeast region found that this 
harassment “may adversely affect . . . the continued existence of the 
northern right, humpback, and fin whales.”143   Accordingly, mitigation 
measures (including observers and lookouts when tankers were in transit) 
were all that was required of the applicant to reach the statutory threshold 
for approval.144  
Beyond harassment impacts to mammals, LNG port operations can 
affect fish and plankton and destroy habitat—ballast water discharge and 
uptake and cooling water used in regasification result in the 
impingement, entrainment, and thermal-shock of marine organisms.  In 
the 2006 environmental review of the Northeast Gateway port, reviewers 
determined that these activities could cause the destruction of 10.4 
trillion phytoplankton, 342 billion zooplankton, 27,000 lobster larvae, 2 
million fish eggs, and 743,000 fish larvae each year.145   In addition to 
these direct impacts, during construction and operation of LNG 
deepwater ports, biocides (such as chlorine) are used to prevent fouling 
of pipes and tanks by organisms.146  These chemicals are designed to be 
toxic to marine life (to prevent the accrual of biota), and are regularly 
                                            
 139. 43 U.S.C. §§ 2102-2106 (2006). 
 140. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (2006). 
 141. 33 C.F.R. § 148.737. 
 142. Taking of Marine Mammals Incidental to Specified Activities; Operation of an 
LNG Facility in Massachusetts Bay, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,485, 29,489 (May 21, 2008). 
 143. Id. at 29,490. 
 144. Id. at 29, 241. 
 145. U.S. COAST GUARD, DEP’T OF TRANSP. DOCKET NO. 2005-22219, MEPA EDEA 
NO. 13473/13474, USCG FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND MEPA FINAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR NORTHEAST GATEWAY ENERGY BRIDGE, L.L.C. 
LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS DEEPWATER PORT LICENSE APPLICATION 4-33–4-35, 4-37 
(2006). 
 146. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DEP’T OF ENERGY, FERC DOCKET NO. 
CP06-5400; CP06-5500, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR BROADWATER 
LNG PROJECT 3-88 (2008). 
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discharged by vessels and ports causing indirect impacts to port 
ecosystems.147   
For a recently proposed Liberty Natural Gas deepwater port in New 
Jersey, application materials submitted to the USCG and MARAD detail 
the variety of water quality impacts possible from an LNG port.148  First, 
pipes and pipelines will be hydrostatically tested using ambient seawater 
chemically treated with biocides.149  The pipeline testing process is 
anticipated to result in the discharge of almost 720,000 gallons of 
biocide-treated wastewater into near shore New Jersey state waters.150  
For another project proposed in New Jersey waters, the ASIG port, 37.6 
million gallons of seawater was anticipated to be needed in the 
hydrostatic testing of pipelines, storage tanks, and start-up processes.151  
Second, each of the four Liberty Natural Gas regasification/offloading 
buoys will  intake, treat with biocides, and discharge up to 8.2 million 
gallons per day of cooling water into the surrounding environment.152  
The Liberty Natural Gas applicant disclosed that the thermal differential 
of this cooling water (in relation to the ecosystem) is expected to be “in 
the range of approximately 5°C to 8°C (9°F to 14.4°F), with a maximum 
difference of 10°C (18°F).”153  Third, the applicant expects to require 
11.56 million gallons per day of uptake for ballast water purposes at its 
four-vessel-capacity port.154   The ASIG project anticipated 7 to 27 
million gallons per tanker per visit for ballast, for a potential total of over 
2 billion gallons ballast water per year.155 
Aside from direct fish and mammal impacts and water quality 
effects, LNG port operations can permanently alter seafloor habitat.156  
When LNG tankers arrive at a deepwater port and moor to the facility’s 
pipeline connections, their anchor chains drag across the seafloor 
                                            
 147. Id. at 3-56.  
 148. See Liberty Natural Gas L.L.C., MARAD Docket #USCG-2010-0993-0005, 
Liberty Natural Gas Deepwater Port Application, Vol. I, app. C, (2010) [hereinafter 
Liberty Natural Gas, NPDES Permit Application].   
 149. Id. at 1-9.    
 150. Id. at 1-9, 1-11.  
 151. Safe Harbor Energy, Biological Resources Report, supra note 69, at 3-52. 
 152. Liberty Natural Gas, NPDES Permit Application, supra note 148, at 1-12. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 3-5. 
 155. Safe Harbor Energy, Biological Resources Report, supra note 69, at 3-52. 
 156. DEBORAH CRANSWICK, MINERALS MGMT. SERV., DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OCS 
REPORT MMS 2001-067, BRIEF OVERVIEW OF GULF OF MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS 
PIPELINES:  INSTALLATION, POTENTIAL IMPACTS, AND MITIGATION MEASURES 10 (2001), 
available at http://www.mms.gov/itd/pubs/2001/2001-067.pdf.   
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repeatedly.157  At the Northeast Gateway LNG terminal, the USCG found 
that this “scouring” impacted an area up to thirty-eight acres per vessel, 
resulting in “long-term reduction to benthic productivity.”158  For many 
marine industries, anchor damage is a significant concern—it has been 
found to be “the greatest threat to live-bottom areas . . . [because it can 
result in] crushing and breaking of live/hard bottoms and associated 
communities.”159  “Accidental anchor impacts . . . could be extensive, 
with recovery taking longer than 20 years, and they could be permanent, 
depending on the severity of the impact.”160  In unprotected open ocean 
habitats, ocean swells and wave action can increase the acreage impacted 
by anchor scouring.  For the ASIG project described above, the proposed 
artificial island would cover 116 acres of seafloor, thus destroying 116 
acres of habitat,161 and suspended sediments from the island-filling could 
coat hundreds more acres of seafloor.162   
All told, the direct, indirect, and habitat-altering impacts from LNG 
deepwater ports can be significant.  For the Northeast Gateway LNG port 
application, reviewing federal agencies concluded that “[o]peration of 
the Port and Pipeline Lateral will result in long-term effects on the 
marine environment, including alteration of seafloor conditions, 
continued disturbance of the seafloor, regular withdrawal of sea water, 
and regular generation of underwater noise.”163  Noise, light, and air 
pollution impacts also abound in the construction, operation, and 
decommissioning stages of the port and connecting pipelines.  
Aesthetically, deepwater ports with tankers moored can, depending on 
distance at sea, be seen from beaches and coastal properties, potentially 
affecting land values.  Under the DWPA, however, as long as these 
effects are minimized, environmental concerns will not derail an LNG 
port project.  Indeed, as noted above, if environmental concerns are the 
only substantive impediments to licensure or the sole basis for an ACS 
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LNG Facility in Massachusetts Bay, 73 Fed. Reg. 29,485, 29,489 (May 21, 2008). 
 158. Id. 
 159. CRANSWICK, supra note 156, at 10. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Safe Harbor Energy, Biological Resources Report, supra note 69, at 3-50, 3-51. 
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LNG Facility in Massachusetts Bay, 73 Fed. Reg. 29, 485, 29, 489 (May 21, 2008). 
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governor veto, MARAD can condition licenses and permits to address 
these concerns and approve the port application.   
C.  Lifecycle Carbon Footprint of LNG Imports 
As liquefaction and transport of LNG involves compressing natural 
gas to over 600 times its normal volume—and maintaining it in that 
state—there are many downsides to its use as a commodity.  “The energy 
content of a single standard LNG tanker [generally, one hundred twenty-
five thousand cubic meters] is equivalent to seven-tenths of a megaton of 
TNT, or about fifty-five Hiroshima bombs.”164  When an LNG tanker 
arrives at a port, it is heated back to gaseous state to be transported via 
pipeline to a gas hub.  Thereafter, the gas is functionally the same as 
domestic natural gas, used for heating, industrial uses, and electricity.   
The energy expended to compress gas into liquefied form, the 
cooling water operations required to re-heat the LNG, and the costs of 
operating tankers and LNG deepwater ports are a full-lifecycle set of 
significant environmental impacts.  “[T]he range of life-cycle GHG 
[greenhouse gas] emissions of electricity generated with LNG is 
significantly closer to the range of emissions from coal than the life-
cycle emissions of natural gas produced in North America.”165  In a study 
by Carnegie Mellon researchers, the lifecycle from natural gas plants 
fueled by LNG can actually result in similar CO2 emissions than that of 
the lifecycle from coal plants.166  Indeed, the process of liquefaction of 
natural gas into LNG alone produces more CO2 emissions than the whole 
lifecycle of coal prior to combustion, including production, processing, 
and transport.167  Between domestic natural gas and imported LNG, 
research by Greenpeace for a California LNG DWPA proposal 
demonstrates that “[t]he combined impact of venting carbon dioxide 
during processing and the energy penalty of the LNG supply chain would 
increase carbon dioxide emissions by roughly 20 to 40 percent over 
California’s current emissions from domestic sources of natural gas.”168   
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24 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
V.  LNG—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE POLICY ISSUES 
In the early years of the last decade, LNG imports were rapidly 
becoming major players in the U.S.’s domestic market to the point that 
the DWPA was amended to further incentivize and provide for import 
capacity.  Locally, LNG made sense in the domestic market farthest from 
any production centers—New England.  Gradually, however, the 
domestic market warmed up to shale gas development, import capacity 
grew too fast and outstripped demand, and the global market for LNG 
shipments intensified.  With our currently changing understanding of 
shale gas, the burgeoning globalization of LNG cargoes, and an 
abundance of coastal import capacity, decisions on what is in the 
“national energy interest” for deepwater port licensing are not keeping up 
with shifting baselines.  
A.  Excessive (and Growing) Approved Import Capacity 
As of the summer of 2011, the United States is experiencing a glut of 
LNG import capacity.  Between offshore deepwater ports and onshore 
LNG terminals (including projects currently under construction), import 
capacity stands at 17.535 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d).169  Of that 
capacity, the majority is at onshore terminals; deepwater ports represent 
only 1.7 Bcf/d of existing capacity.170  Beyond this existing capacity, 
FERC and MARAD/USCG have approved 20.25 Bcf/d more capacity in 
new terminals, ports, and expansions to existing facilities.171  This 
increase in capacity includes 3.6 Bcf/d of new deepwater port capacity at 
three approved sites in the Gulf of Mexico.172  Finally, there are 
proposals for new facilities that have not yet been approved, including 
the Liberty Natural Gas proposal for coastal New Jersey that would have 
a 2.4 Bcf/d capacity (discussed above, Section IV.B).173  
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 171. OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, NORTH 
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“disapproval” of the Liberty LNG project under the DWPA’s ACS governor powers, but 
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Despite all of this capacity, the market for LNG imports is falling, 
and the ports already built are seeing a dearth of customers.  As of 
September 1, 2011, LNG monthly imports had fallen to their lowest 
point in more than eight years, down to 20.2 Bcf, or just 0.65 Bcf/d.174  
Put in perspective, this represents just a 3.7% utilization of existing 
capacity and would be just a 1.9% utilization level if all approved LNG 
import facilities and expansions not yet constructed were completed.  
“U.S. imports have been declining throughout 2011 as shippers send gas 
to higher-paying markets in Europe and Asia.”175  In June 2011, “imports 
fell 16 percent, May imports fell 12 percent.”176 
The most recent year-long dataset available shows that the nation 
imported just 431 million cubic feet of LNG in 2010, down from 631 
Mcf in 2005.177  This represents an annual import rate of 1.2 Bcf/d, or a 
six percent utilization rate of existing capacity.  Short-term energy 
outlooks developed by the federal government project that “U.S. imports 
of liquefied natural gas [will] fall from 1.2 Bcf/d in 2010 to 1.0 Bcf/d in 
both 2011 and 2012.”178  Therefore, when all currently-under-
construction capacity is concluded, the U.S. will have the capacity to 
import almost twenty times more LNG per day before import facilities 
are fully utilized.   If the approved deepwater ports in the Gulf of Mexico 
are completed within this time frame, as expected, the nation will have 
even more daily capacity than needed. In 2008, before LNG import 
demand was in full-blown decline, energy experts projected that over the 
long-term, “capacity utilization at the U.S. LNG import facilities is 
expected to remain below 50 percent through 2030.”179 
                                                                                                  
but that the application would not be further reviewed until the applicant could 
demonstrate to MARAD that the Governor’s concerns were addressed.  Letter from Chris 
Christie, Governor of N.J., to David T. Matsuda, Mar. Adm’r, Dep’t of Transp. (Feb. 8, 
2001) (MARAD Docket #USCG-2010-0993-0038) (conveying Governor Christie’s 
disapproval of a license issuance for the Liberty Project); Letter from K. Denise Rucker 
Krepp, Chief Counsel, Dep’t of Transp., to Frederick M. Lowther, Dickstein Shapiro 
L.L.P. (May 11, 2011) (MARAD  Docket No. USCG-2010-0993-0110) (conveying the 
“no legal significance” determination). 
 174. Edward McAllister, US LNG Imports Dive 44 Pct, Hit 8-1/2 Year Low-DOE, 
REUTERS, Sept. 1, 2011,  http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/ 
idAFN1E7801VK20110901. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. U.S. Natural Gas Imports, supra note 8.  
 178. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK (2011), available at 
http://www.eia.gov/emeu/steo/pub/steo_full.pdf.  
 179. Revised Energy Outlook: Hearing Before H. Comm. On Energy and Natural Res, 
110th Cong. 11 (2008) (statement of Guy Caruso, Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Energy 
26 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:1 
 
 
The rapid growth of shale gas production expected in the United 
States lessens the need for U.S. imports.  The Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) international energy outlook projects that the 
need for gas imports will decrease “from 16 percent of total supply in 
2007 to 6 percent in 2035” as new domestic shale plays begin to come 
online.180  While, as noted above, several new LNG import facilities and 
expansions to existing facilities are expected to come online soon, 
“[c]ompetition for supplies in the world market [will limit] the amount of 
LNG that reaches U.S. markets.”181   
In short, there is an overabundance of LNG import capacity and a 
declining need for the space as domestic natural gas production increases 
and global LNG prices soar. Fortunately, “recent declines in expectations 
of future U.S. demand for natural gas imports have led many to conclude 
that North America will be relatively self-sufficient in natural gas 
production for some time to come and will not need large volumes of 
imported LNG.”182 
                                                                                                  
Info. Admin.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-
110shrg42513/pdf/CHRG-110shrg42513.pdf. 
 180. ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010, supra note 18, at 51.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 48. 
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B.  Market Shifts and Energy Supply 
Coupling increasing global LNG prices with significant unused idle 
domestic capacity, there is little economic need for new import facilities, 
either land-based or deepwater ports.  After the 2011 Japanese 
earthquake “and subsequent nuclear generation outages, Japan’s demand 
for LNG as a replacement fuel for electric power generation is expected 
to increase, contributing to higher global LNG prices.”183  This price 
change will make it even less profitable to bring LNG into the lower-
priced U.S. market.  In 2009, then-FERC Commissioner Jon Wellinghoff 
issued a dissenting opinion for a new LNG terminal in Maryland, finding 
that a new terminal was not economical or even “ needed to serve the 
energy needs of the Mid-Atlantic [NJ, NY, PA] and South Atlantic 
regions,” and that “future energy needs of these regions can be better met 
with alternative resources . . . .”184   
Adding to the shifting market price of LNG (that leads to less likely 
utilization of U.S. import facilities) is an increasing international 
liquefaction capacity.  “World natural gas liquefaction capacity [will 
increase] 2.4-fold, from about 8 trillion cubic feet in 2007 to 19 trillion 
cubic feet in 2035.”185   At these new export facilities, “high volumes (or 
high ‘takes’) are often used to ensure high utilization rates and 
acceptable returns on investments,” meaning that the currently high 
prices for LNG cargoes will be locked in for the long-term.186  If prices 
do change, they will likely become higher, not lower, as European 
production “declines [and] its import demand increases.”187  Similar 
demand (with no increase in local production) is expected in Asia, 
particularly China.188 
In order to see economical imports into the United States, prices here 
“will need to move well above current $9-$10 per million Btu levels to 
interfere with this [LNG] trade as long as [Asian markets] are willing to 
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pay upward of $14/MMBtu for spot supply.”189  At the end of 2010, U.S. 
natural gas traders were importing LNG at the average rate of $4.52 per 
thousand cubic feet.190   
Significantly, in “[r]esponding to the changing market for liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) imports into the U.S. Gulf Coast,” Excelerate Energy 
announced that it is retiring the Gulf Gateway deepwater port, closing the 
0.5 Bcf/d of capacity that has not seen many cargoes in the past few 
years.191  Decommissioning and closure for Gulf Gateway seemed to be 
the best economic decision given that Dominion Energy’s Cove Point 
LNG import terminal was “forced to pay a dear price for an August 
cargo just to keep the terminal’s empty tanks cold” when it bought a 
LNG shipment at $8 per million Btu when U.S. gas futures were only at 
$4.10 per million Btu.192  Similarly adjusting their business model 
because of the economic realities of the natural gas market, the owners of 
the approved, but not built, Port Dolphin deepwater port are going to 
abandon plans to import gas from foreign sources and instead “bring gas 
to Florida from Louisiana and Texas”—bypassing the need for pipelines 
to connect western Gulf of Mexico production with Florida demand.193   
C.  Exports 
Between 2005 and 2010, the outlook for imported LNG abruptly 
switched from a market that seemed to be on the verge of taking off to a 
situation where LNG import terminals have gone years without 
shipments.  As noted above, between 2005 and 2010, import volume was 
reduced by thirty percent and market price fell by forty percent.194  Part 
of the reason for this reduction in import is the explosion of domestic gas 
production—in the same five years through 2010, shale gas production 
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grew by an average of forty-eight percent per year.195  According to 
Department of Energy testimony given at a recent Senate hearing on 
LNG exports, “domestic gross gas production from shale increased to 3.4 
trillion cubic feet (Tcf) in 2009, compared to 2.3 Tcf in 2008.”196  Based 
on this increase in gas production, prices (per million Btu) are not 
expected to rise above the $5.00 mark until 2020.197  Net gas imports are 
expected to fall from eleven percent of total supply (in 2009) to one 
percent (in 2035).198  One energy expert, when discussing this market 
shift, stated that “[t]he problem is no longer whether the U.S. will run out 
of natural gas,” “but rather what should we do with all the gas supply we 
now have.”199  In sum, deepwater ports for LNG imports have switched 
from worthwhile investments to costly boondoggles. 
Given these changed circumstances, port and terminal owners are 
looking into a new way to make economical use of their facilities: 
exportation (domestic gas liquefied) and re-exportation (exporting 
previously-imported LNG).  Exports and re-exports in the continental 
United States took off in 2010.200  After years of only shipping LNG to 
Japan (from one facility in Alaska), and in small quantities to Mexico, 
2010 saw over thirty million cubic feet of gas sent to Spain, South Korea, 
the United Kingdom, Brazil, and India.201  The price of this exported and 
re-exported gas was regularly higher than the price of domestically-
produced gas, the average price per thousand cubic feet of exported LNG 
in 2010 was $9.53,202 compared to $4.16 for domestic wellhead prices.203  
Based on this market shift, the project manager for the Jordan Cove LNG 
terminal proposal (in Coos Bay, Oregon) went from saying that 
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exporting LNG “doesn’t make sense” in May of 2011,204 to arguing “that 
exporting gas is an invigorating opportunity” in September of 2011.205   
Under the Natural Gas Act (NGA), “no person shall export any 
natural gas from the United States to a foreign country . . . without first 
having secured an order of the [Secretary of Energy] authorizing it to do 
so.”206  In examining such applications, the Department of Energy (DOE) 
analysis is different depending on which country the LNG exports are 
destined for.  If an application is seeking to export gas to a nation with 
which the United States does not have a free trade agreement, the 
Secretary of Energy “shall issue such order upon application, unless after 
opportunity for hearing, [he] finds that the proposed exportation or 
importation will not be consistent with the public interest.”207  This 
section, thus, creates a “rebuttable presumption that a proposed export of 
natural gas is in the public interest, and requires DOE to grant an export 
application unless DOE finds that the record in the proceeding of the 
application overcomes that presumption.”208  
In changes made to the NGA in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the 
DOE’s review of export applications was further limited with respect to 
public interest consistency determinations.  The exportation of natural 
gas to nations that the United States has a free-trade agreement with, 
under the amended NGA, “shall be deemed to be consistent with the 
public interest, and applications for such importation or exportation shall 
be granted without modification or delay.”209  In the event of an 
application to export natural gas from the United States to one of these 
nations, the DOE “does not conduct a public interest analysis of those 
applications and cannot condition them by the insertion of terms which 
otherwise might be considered necessary or appropriate.”210 
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Aside from the export license authority, there is a question as to 
whether or not exports can be allowed from deepwater ports (as opposed 
to onshore terminals).  In the declaration of policy for the DWPA, 
Congress specifically states that the law is designed to “promote the 
construction and operation of deepwater ports as a safe and effective 
means of importing oil or natural gas into the United States . . . .”211  
Also, Congress specifically set up the DWPA to make deepwater ports 
the safe way to transport “natural gas to the United States mainland,” not 
from it.212  In contrast to these policy statements, under the DWPA 
definition of “deepwater port,” aside from use as an import terminal, a 
port can be used for “transportation of oil or natural gas from the United 
States outer continental shelf.”213  The DWPA was first established “to 
promote the efficient transport of oil to the United States in a manner 
minimizing the environmental hazards associated with carriage of oil by 
sea.”214   
As the DWPA has evolved, it is difficult to say whether the act’s 
purpose has become the orderly import of energy resources to the United 
States or the proper siting of energy-transfer facilities on the OCS.  If the 
latter, then exports will likely be allowed through deepwater ports.   As 
most of the actual DWPA processes revolve around construction, 
operation, and decommissioning aspects (which would not necessarily be 
different for deepwater ports with export capabilities), courts might 
likely read the export question as being outside the scope of the DWPA 
and/or the jurisdiction and expertise of MARAD and the USCG. 
The economic advantage of exporting and re-exporting LNG comes 
from international demand for gas, the price of domestic gas, and the 
open capacity at most U.S. LNG ports and terminals.  At the Freeport 
terminal in Texas, “one spot cargo was delivered . . . for $9.32 per 
million [Btu]” only to later re-export the same shipment to Brazil at 
$12.05 per million Btu.215  Because there was an overabundance of 
unused storage space at the Freeport terminal, the owners of that space 
could afford to wait until someone on the gas-starved international 
market was willing to pay a high enough cost.   
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Dominion Energy, operator of the Cove Point LNG terminal in 
Maryland, is applying to be a re-exporter of LNG to ensure that when 
they need to buy gas for tank cooling purposes, they can sell it 
internationally for a profit instead of domestically for a significant 
loss.216  Dominion also recently announced it had submitted an 
application for the right to export domestically-produced gas.217  If 
Dominion wins both of these approvals, it will join the Sabine Pass, 
Freeport, and Cameron terminals as a re-exporting and/or exporting 
site.218   
The exportation of LNG from the United States is such a new idea 
that the Annual Energy Outlook by the Energy Information 
Administration, developed in early 2011, did not consider them in the 
long-term outlook.  According to the EIA, “[a]lthough U.S. LNG export 
projects have been proposed, their economic viability remains uncertain . 
. . .” 219  Given that several terminals are getting into the business of 
exporting and re-exporting, global LNG prices are not projected to drop 
below U.S. domestic natural gas prices, and the United States has 
significant unused LNG capacity at its terminals and ports, our oceans 
and coasts could potentially be pressured by an uptick in LNG vessel 
traffic and terminal construction in the next decade.   
Aside from the viability aspect of LNG exports, questions have been 
raised about the practices’ potential impact on domestic energy prices—
specifically, the potential for exportation to cause increases in local 
prices.  In its application to export domestically-produced natural gas 
from Cove Point, Maryland, Dominion Energy claimed that, if the DOE 
were to grant the license, exports “would only modestly boost gas 
prices.”220  Dominion Energy disclosed that local Henry Hub (a natural 
gas market price metric) price of gas would reach $6.00 per million Btu 
in 2027, two years earlier than the Energy Information Administration 
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currently estimates that prices will reach that level.221  As the Oregon 
Attorney General recently noted, if exports open domestic gas to a 
“world market, [local natural gas] price would equalize . . . [i]t would be 
more expensive here and less expensive there.”222   
Several days after the Oregon Attorney General raised these 
concerns, the DOE Assistant Secretary for Oil & Natural Gas, 
Christopher Smith, told the U.S. Association of Energy Economists that 
the Department “is weighing the cumulative price effect of exports, as 
more export applications are being filed.”223  After having already 
granted several applications for licenses to export domestic (and re-
export imported) natural gas, this announcement by the DOE (that it is 
performing its “due diligence”224) seems disingenuous. At a November, 
2011 hearing before the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural 
Resources on “[t]he Department of Energy’s Role in Liquefied Natural 
Gas Export Applications,” Mr. Smith testified that 
DOE presently has before it four long-term applications to 
export lower-48 domestically produced LNG to countries with 
which the United States does not have a free trade agreement 
that requires national treatment for trade in natural gas. The 
volumes of LNG that could be authorized for export in these 
non-free trade agreement applications, including the 2.2 Bcf/d 
authorized for export in Sabine Pass, would total 6.6 Bcf/d, 
which represents 10 percent of total current domestic natural gas 
daily consumption in the United States. Consistent with the 
Natural Gas Act, DOE already has granted authorization from 
these five facilities to export this same volume to free trade 
agreement countries.225 
Only after having authorized 8.8 Bcf/d of exports and re-exports, and 
with another four applications pending, did the department, 
commission two studies “to address the potential cumulative impact of 
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a grant of the pending applications.”226  These studies, taken together, 
“will address the impacts of additional natural gas exports on domestic 
energy consumption, production, and prices, as well as the cumulative 
impact on the U.S. economy.”227   
While the next batch of export applications are processed and the 
DOE weighs the effect exportation could have on domestic energy 
prices, the future of deepwater ports and onshore terminals appears to be 
a mix of spot imports and export capacity construction. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Riding the short-lived need for natural gas import facilities on the 
U.S. OCS, several deepwater ports were licensed and built under the 
requirements of the DWPA.  Several more have been approved but not 
yet been built, and several more are in development or are active 
applications.  Coupled with numerous on-shore coastal LNG terminals, 
the United States rapidly developed a glut of LNG capacity, several 
times the capacity needed, to handle existing import demand.  Once 
domestic natural gas production began to rise, these ports became less 
profitable and less utilized, and ports sat idle.  One deepwater port has 
already initiated the decommissioning process, yet three more promise to 
start construction within the next few years.  Given the overcapacity of 
the U.S. market and the past year’s market shift to LNG exports and re-
exports, the future of deepwater ports is clouded.  Whether licensing 
agencies will continue to find that LNG import facilities are in the 
national interest when the facilities will either sit idle or be used to send 
domestically produced gas overseas is a question that remains 
unanswered.  Given the rapid turnaround of export and re-export 
authorization requests and the pendency of several deepwater port 
construction projects and new applications, we will likely soon find out. 
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